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THERE'S NO SUCH THING AS A FREE LUNCH: HOW "FREEBIES" AND "CREDIT" OPERATE AS PART OF RATIONAL DRUG MARKET ACTIVITY

ROSS COOMBER
Twenty-one incarcerated drug dealers and 60 opiate users were questioned about the provision of "freebies" (free drugs) and credit in drug market transactions in London and the UK. In particular, each group was asked about the context within which either of these activities might occur and the underlying rationales for them. In contradiction to the common image of drug dealers providing "freebies" as an attempt to secure the custom of nonaddicted individuals (often portrayed as children), it emerged that the provision of free drugs and credit took place within tightly circumscribed conditions. Primarily, the provision of free drugs and credit (two distinct modes of operation with differing outcomes) were available to those known and "trusted" by the dealer and used to cultivate and bond customer relations (freebies) as well as facilitate continued business with the reliable (credit). Credit was not used to "trap" individuals into a dealing relationship. Rather, both parties approach it cautiously. How the provision of free drugs and credit are representative of broader aspects of dealer/user seller/buyer relationships, with particular emphasis on the management of that relationship, is discussed. Brief consideration is also given to the context of drug sales at raves and other dance events, as it is often the case that "the offer" in this context may be made to users unknown to the dealer.
INTRODUCTION
The idea that much addictive drug use results from the actions of unscrupulous drug dealers "pushing" the drugs they sell onto the young, naïve, vulnerable, and innocent has had and continues to have resonance. Moreover, the accompanying notion that this often involves them giving away free drugs (freebies) to first "hook" (addict) this population and second, once hooked, to ensnare them as a clients encourages a particular view of what the drug problem is and who is -in part at least -to blame for it. Although these notions are not as universally accepted as some beliefs about how dealers operate (see Coomber, 1997a Coomber, , 1999a -largely because the literature does contest that initiation into drugs is usually via friends, family, or known acquaintances -it nonetheless remains a route to drug use and addiction by those less acquainted with such literature. In particular, it is reasonably well ingrained in the popular consciousness as one of the dangers "out there" in this age of ubiquitous risk. If the "pushing" of drugs as described above is a real and significant risk, then such concern is justified. However, if the belief is either untrue or exaggerated, it serves only to distract us from where drug initiation is most likely to occur. Consequently, the aim of preventing drug use will be undermined, not reinforced.
In 1928, one of the most authoritative books on opium and heroin addiction to be published at that time, The Opium Problem (Terry & Pellens, 1928, p. 87) referred to the drug peddler whose practice was to give away sufficient amounts of a drug to get users addicted, then to charge users for their drugs with sufficient markup to cover previous losses. In fact, this was suggested as one epidemiological rationale for the spread of opium and heroin addiction around the U.S. at that time. A few years earlier, in 1924, the New York Times had put a similar spin on how drug use was thought to be spread:
It is the custom to give away heroin free to the youth until he or she is "hooked." When children are away from home it is a safe practice to accept nothing as a gift to eat, drink or whiff, not even from a supposed friend. When you decline the first offer the boy or girl aiding the peddler will taunt you or challenge you and say "try anything once, you will get a kick out of it"; "watch me"; "come to our 'snow party' and watch the other fellows do it." But once is once too often. The poison is so swift that the poor youth will seek the next party for relief, and the next. A "snow party" a day for a week will drag a youth into the bondage of addiction worse than death, and from which experience teaches there is no sure escape. (http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/history/e1920/nyt110924.htm) By the early 1940s, Lindesmith (1941, p. 204) , stating that, "No evidence has been produced to show that this sort of thing is actually done…" was concerned that reports of this kind and such ideas were still being widely propagated. Not only, he claimed, was there a lack of evidence to suggest that drug dealers entice the nondrug user with free drugs but there were (and are) a number of good reasons why such an approach to peddling (pushing) would be actively avoided by the drug dealer. To begin with, new users to addictive drugs cannot be addicted very quickly. The impression given in the New York Times quote above repeats the often believed but fallacious idea of the "one try and you're hooked" variety. First, addiction to drugs such as heroin normally 1 takes many months -the dealer could not afford to subsidize one, never mind numerous new users in the hope that they would become addicted and then stay with that dealer once addicted for supplies. Second, nonusers, particularly children, could not be trusted not to tell others that they were being given free drugs. The risk of exposure, arrest, and, incarceration to the dealer who chooses this route of recruitment would be so high as to make it a highly unlikely activity. Kaplan (1985) and Pearson (1987) are but two researchers that have more recently questioned the wisdom (and the evidence) that drug dealers provide free drugs, such as heroin, to entice those that are not already users, although this is a very under-researched aspect of drug markets.
Despite protestations from researchers such as Lindesmith and others, the idea of the pusher at the street corner, at the school gate, or leaning out of the ice-cream van has not gone away. In 1996, a New York professor proselytized:
The war on drugs creates other casualties beyond those arrested. There are the ones killed in fights over turf; innocents caught in crossfire; citizens terrified of city streets; escalating robberies; children given free crack to get them addicted and then enlisted as runners and dealers (my emphasis). (Wink, 1996) In a similar vein:
What are we teaching our children? What are we doing to prevent them from using drugs at an age when they are still innocent and vulnerable? Drugs are, I believe, one of the greatest dangers facing us today. Drug dealers roam our schools, offering ten-, twelve-, and fourteen-year-old children free drugs to get them hooked. I cannot tell you how harsh I would be if I were a judge, sentencing these drug dealers, these death merchants. (Wiesal, 1997) It is perhaps easy to see why such a rationale for drug dealing would emerge. Drugs are feared. Drug use by the young is feared in particular. Drug dealers are considered to be less than average in terms of moral standards, and the idea of providing enticements is one we are very familiar with in everyday trading transactions. "Special offers" in many shops provide the buy one get one free approach to selling, or the buy this product and get 20% extra. The intention is to either entice new customers from those who might normally use another brand and/or to cement loyalty from existing customers who may have been looking at alternative products.
That the general idea of dealers giving away free drugs permeates our culture in all sorts of ways is visible beyond the type of evangelical posturing of Wink or Wiesal quoted above. All around us are both direct and indirect references to its supposed existence and prevalence. Reference can be found for example in the way that major pharmaceutical companies are often reported as pushing freebies to doctors to get them to prescribe their brand of drugs (Irish Parliament Joint Committee on Health and Children, 1998; Japsen, 2001) . The analogy is a direct one and a casual exploration on a search engine such as Google® (search: freebies drug) will provide the reader with numerous other examples of those being condemned for unscrupulously giving away free goods to entice people to do something the marketers want and it is often with direct reference to how this is the same as that undertaken by drug dealers.
Indirect reference may also be made in the form of common humor. The following joke, which compares computer software developers to drug dealers, again arguably sums up common currency on the way dealers are thought to operate: Asian connections (to help Asian connections (to help move the stuff).
debug the code).
Strange jargon: "Stick," Strange jargon: "SCSI," "RTFM," "Rock," "Dime bag," "E."
"Java," "ISDN."
Realize that there's tons Realize that there's tons of cash of cash in the 14-to in the 14-to 25-year-old market. 25-year-old market.
Job is assisted by the industry's Job is assisted by the industry's producing newer, more potent producing newer, faster machines. mixes.
Often seen in the company of Often seen in the company of pimps and hustlers.
marketing people and venture capitalists. Their product causes DOOM. Quake. SimCity. Duke Nukem unhealthy addictions.
(http://www.cyberiapc.com/gen0001.htm) These analogies are of course drawing attention to the unreasonable and corrupt nature of enticement as entrapment. That such a belief is common currency is arguably further evidenced by the fact that one British primary school (ages 5-11) has gone so far as to update Prokofiev's Peter and the Wolf to parody the dangers to children on poor local authority housing estates:
Her stepfather advises Anita not stray too far from the house, especially after dusk, and warns her about the kind of people she might run into. Clearly this authority has a poor understanding not only of pharmacology and the nature of addiction, but it does not stop him from making bold statements to his listening public about either this or the way aspects of the drug market are assumed to work. Does his audience know any better? A number of films, such as Spike Lee's Clockers (1995); Nocolas Winding Refn's Pusher (1996) ; Danny Boyles Trainspotting (1996) The idea of dealers providing free samples to the young, naïve, and vulnerable is common currency, and we need only refer to the various ways in which it is integrated into cultural representations of the practice and how others who are being maligned can be similarly "tarred" with one of the most evil of available brushes. Such beliefs also gain currency from other beliefs. As has been argued elsewhere (Coomber, FALL 2003 1997c), each of the various dealer myths serves to support the others. If, for example, the heinous practice of dangerous adulteration is commonly believed, then an equally heinous behavior of pushing to the young, uninitiated, and vulnerable by offering freebies is also easier to believe and vice versa.
NO SMOKE WITHOUT FIRE?
Does the provision of free drugs take place? There is almost no research into whether free drugs are provided by drug dealers or indeed under what circumstances they are given if they are. A few pieces of research have referred to it as an aside in relation to other aspects of the research being outlined (Jacobs & Miller, 1998; Jacobs, 1999; Caulkins, Johnson, Taylor, & Taylor, 1999; Skolnick, Correl, Navarro, & Rabb, 1997) , but little attempt has been made to understand the nature of freebies in drug market transactions in any detail.
A range of research that has focused on other aspects of drug market interactions, however, does provide greater insight into and a further context for the issue explored here. Much of the prominent illicit drug market research literature (Adler,1985; Adler & Adler, 1983 , 1994 Murphy, Waldorf, & Reinarman, 1990) reporting on the social/business networks of upper-level cocaine and marijuana smugglers and dealers and middle-class dealers, respectively, do not at first glance appear to have much resonance with the issue at hand. The provision of freebies, as evidenced by the various quotes and representations above, is really thought to apply to the street dealer -the dealer who preys on the uninitiated or vulnerable looking to "push" their wares and then hook them as customers. The dealers in Murphy et al.'s (1990) research were considered to be, dealing apart, no different from any other normal law abiding U.S. citizen. Most became dealers through supply to friends and thereafter maintained good networks to attract new clients. Similarly, Adler and Adler (1983, 1994) report extensive and varying networks (from closely bonded and friendly ties to those that were either known by reputation and/or occasional business). New business was carefully controlled and tended to involve use of the network, among other factors, to maintain security:
Dealing circles were generally very close, tightly knit groups who were mutually compatible personally, socially, and demographically. They attracted people of roughly the same age, race and ethnic origin who conducted their business along similar standards of security, reliability, involvement and commitment. (Adler & Adler, 1994, p. 311) These individuals then, working within relatively closed markets 3 , where concern for their own security and those with whom they work, accrue new business in a way that militates against the kind of practices associated with the giving of free drugs in the public mind. The kind of pushing being explored in this paper would present unacceptable risks to such individuals and groups. It is the dealers on the corner and on the street who need to be considered. It would be wrong, however, to simply assume that open markets operate with no informal controls to protect the seller from the buyer who is potentially from a law enforcement agency. A whole range of research, mostly (but not exclusively) from North America, has borne witness to the way that lower-level dealers "vet" prospective buyers that are unknown to them, looking for any sign that they are not bona-fide drug users (Jacobs, 1999; Knowles, 1999; Jacobs & Miller, 1998; Mieczkowski, 1990; Edmunds, Hough, & Urquia, 1996) . Street dealers in open markets also have their "faces," that is, their regulars and their irregulars. They may operate within a market setup that provides relatively less security than those operating from closed markets, but security measures are in place.
The kind of ultra-competitive open markets that operated in New York in the mid-1980s when crack cocaine was fast emerging as one of the most profitable drugs to sell is arguably the kind of drug market that many believe to be typical. In the wake of the decline of organized heroin distribution, the lack of law enforcement attention that accompanied it, the emergence of new independent entrepreneurs and small dealing groups not versed in the "old ways" (Andrade, Sifaneck, & Neargus, 1999) , and general economic decline all contributed to a level of market destabilization that Jacobs (1999) is doubtful will happen again. We also need to acknowledge that most new markets do not show the level of openness that accompanied the rise of crack cocaine in the U.S. Indeed, the destabilization experienced in the crack market there, what led Fagan and Chin (1990) to view it as typical of crack markets, did not happen in other countries. In fact, the plateauing out of the crack market and then its relative decline (Golub, Andrew, & Johnson, 1994 , 1997 in New York has led to a shift of selling from aggressively competitive approaches to a more socially bonded mode of organization where "cooperation and inter-reliance" have come to predominate (Curtis & Wendel, 1999) . Other factors such as aggressive or "zero tolerance" policing of drug markets can also reduce the prevalence of open markets and move dealing indoors and off the street in the sense that sellers become less visible and thus less accessible to law enforcement. A decline in visibility brings with it a concomitant increase in closure or barriers and, thus, protection of the seller. Access to a seller needs to be through a known contact, and some groups may enhance this by selling/dealing only within their own kinship, ethnic, or tightly bonded social groups (Curtis & Wendel; Edmunds et al., 1996) . In the U.K., closed markets of lone operators or small numbers of closely connected individuals likely predominate (Dorn, Murji, & South, 1992; Parker, Burry, & Egginton, 1998, May 200) as they may increasingly do in the U.S. (Andrade et al., 1999; Jacobs, 1999) and other parts of Europe (Paoli, 2001) . If this is the case, then dealers are even more unlikely to come into contact with the uninitiated, young, and vulnerable.
Closed markets are more reliant on the forms of social interaction and networking described by Adler and Adler (1994) than open markets, as an emphasis on maintaining a consistent client base is of greater importance. For Prus (1989a Prus ( , 1989b this will require clients and dealers to adopt aspects of buying and selling that are generic to all such market activities, regardless of the licit or illicit nature of the enterprise. All individuals involved in the pursuit of sales will need to instill trust in their clients, if their custom is not to be short lived, and doing so will involve a range of methods for cultivating such trust. Jacobs (1999) , drawing on Prus (1989a Prus ( , 1989b and Bigus (1972) , has discussed such issues in relation to crack dealers in the U.S. and specifically refers to the various techniques of cultivation used by dealers in an arena of high competition. Jacobs discusses both the provision of extra free samples and credit in relation to loyalty, creating activity and the management of the control over the buyer. Some support for Jacobs' perspective on the meaning of credit was found in this research and discussed, but it is important to note that the use of freebies and credit to existing drug users is quite distinct from the stereotype outlined previously where such activity is thought to prey on the nondrug or nonaddicted user.
It was the specific aim of this research to explore these issues -both from the perspective of the dealer and the buyer. The provision of free drugs has certainly been recorded in other research and is also confirmed by the research presented here. Little evidence (if any), however, has been found to support the conventional rationale for its existence -the enticement of nonusers to an addicted lifestyle for the beneficence of the dealer involved. A second concern of this research was to explore the related, but distinct, practice of the provision of credit to buyers, its prevalence, its rationale, and its place in dealing dynamics.
The issue is an important one. As with the common perception of dangerous adulteration, the idea of the evil dealer pushing his wares onto to the unsuspecting or merely curious helps produce a relatively dehumanized and homogenous image of what drug dealers are (inhumane/inhuman) and the kind of practices they use to obtain new customers and maximize their profit margins. If, however, as the evidence suggests for dangerous adulteration (see Coomber, 1997a Coomber, , 1997b Coomber, , 1997c Coomber, , 1999a Coomber, , 1999b , the belief is for all practical purposes untrue, then the image of the drug dealer is fundamentally undermined as is a particular view of the nature of the drug problem itself. It is fundamentally unhelpful to concentrate public minds and fears on the imagined pusher when survey after survey relates to us that first use and use thereafter is in the company of friends, family, or acquaintances and that the drugs provided came also from those sources. Sincere warnings about how to avoid initial drug use should focus on where that danger lies, not on some likely imagined encounter. The possible consequences for criminal justice and educational policy are thus highly significant.
METHOD
SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
The two part sample consisted of 21 convicted drug dealers (convicted of intention to supply illicit substances) interviewed in a high profile Southeast London prison and 60 opiate users recruited from five nonresidential treatment/walk-in drug centers in Central and Southeast London. The dealers ranged from front-line sellers who sold on the streets to passers-by, through dealer friends, house dealers, wholesalers, and importers to couriers. The sample was not restricted to sellers of one type of drug, and 12 had sold four or more types of drugs with five of the sample having sold six types of drugs or more. The prison is an adult male-only institution, and, as such, all interviewees were with males over the age of 18.
At the time of the interview, the mean age of the respondents was 34 (range 21-53 years). The mean age of leaving full-time education was 16, and none had stayed past 18 years. Two thirds of the 18 had left by the time they were 15 years of age. Few qualifications other than those obtained in prison or for semi-skilled/ manual work had been obtained.
Only three reported having committed no crime other than that related to drug selling. Of those, the mean age at which the interviewees (n=15) had started their criminality was 15 years old. Crimes commonly cited included car theft and related crimes, robbery, burglary, and theft.
Demographically, the users sampled consisted of 45 (75%) men and 15 (25%) women. They had a mean age of 32 years (from 18-53 years), with the majority (n=50) being between the ages of 25 to 39 years of age. The users were all either currently or recently dependent upon heroin or other opiates. The mean number of years of heroin/opiate use 4 for the users sample was 10.4 years (from four months to 34 years).
The average age at which the respondents left school was 16 years, with the modal age at 15 years. Forty percent (n=29) of the sample left school at either 15 (n=22) or 14 (n=7) years of age. Only eight of the sample continued education beyond 18 years of age. The majority of the sample then, as with the dealers interviewed in prison, consisted of individuals of relatively low socio-economic position and educational achievement. Therefore, it is more helpful to understand FALL 2003 both the dealers and users as relatively working class cohorts, as opposed to the kind of middle-class sample found in Murphy et al., 1990 , for example.
The drug dealers were interviewed on a range of issues relating to drug-dealing careers and activities, whereas the opiate users were primarily interviewed about their drug-using careers. Questions concerning issues of credit and freebies were supplementary. In each case, the interviews were based on respective semistructured questionnaires. The drug dealers were accessed via prison staff who provided information for the study immediately prior to interview days and seeking agreement from inmates to participate in the research. Interviews took place between April 2000 and March 2001 . The drug users were accessed through the various drug centers, where agreement with center staff had been sought and obtained prior to respondents being approached for interviews. Interviews took place between August 2000 and March 2001. Inmates were interviewed by the researcher alone in a room outside of the main recreational area over a number of days. A prison officer who escorted the researcher remained in close proximity at all times but was not present in the interview room. The officer also escorted inmates to and from the interview room between interviews. The identity of interviewees was not made known to the researcher, and the initial part of the interview involved reassuring the interviewees that the researcher was independent of the prison and the criminal justice system in general. Four other individuals who initially were brought for interview were excluded from the study. One of these, on arrival at interview, denied being a drug dealer, while the other three, who had been convicted but not yet sentenced showed reticence toward the interview (clearly not convinced that this might not impact their forthcoming sentence). The rest were judged by the researcher to be "very cooperative" and "very truthful" and were considered to be relaxed and open about their dealing activities. It needs to be acknowledged, however, that even a truthful respondent should not necessarily have their responses taken as the truth. As was demonstrated in Coomber (1997a; 1999) in relation to dangerous drug adulteration, a respondent's belief system can affect what they report to be true, even if they have had no firsthand experience of the belief claimed. That they are close to the issue does not mean that they will report on it reliably (not meaning untruthfully).
For the drug dealers, questions on the provision of freebies and credit were integrated within broader issues regarding drug-dealing activities, particularly those relating to the various relationships built up with both clients and suppliers. They were not emphasized as being of particular interest to the researcher. Of the 21 drug dealers interviewed, two were couriers and two claimed to have only dealt drugs the one time. These are excluded from this data set as not being sufficiently involved in drug dealing to comment.
FINDINGS
THE DRUG DEALERS' RESPONSES FREEBIES
Dealers were asked, "Do you ever provide freebies or tasters?" Thirteen of the 19 dealers responded that they did. However, nearly all of them did so within existing and trustworthy relationships. None of the dealers responded that they would use the promise of free drugs to entice nonusers. This is consistent with their earlier reports that nearly all of the dealers were very careful about whom they sold drugs to and how they needed to have some knowledge of an individual before they would start to sell them drugs (e.g., vouched for by existing contact). It does not, however, fit easily with the image of the drug pusher using free drugs as a way to entice new (nondrug using) clientele. Four of the dealers responded that they did not provide free drugs at all.
Of the 13, a number responded that they would provide free drugs to trusted contacts and regular clients, mainly in the form of testers, "to let them test for strength" and/or in order to allow them to "see I've got the best." Others responded that only "friends" benefited in this way. However, a client base and friend base are often, at least partially, overlapping. One respondent reported using free drugs when "trying to impress a woman," but even then it was only with regular clients and would be restricted to a tester. Two of the dealers did respond that it was "standard procedure" to provide free drugs, but in one case this actually meant providing extra drugs when the buyer had bought a certain amount: "Yes. If someone bought five rocks they'd get one free." Another related a similar approach: "Yes. Depends on how much you have at any one time. For example if I've got 500 E's (ecstasy tablets) I can afford to give six (tablets) instead of five."
The other dealer who alluded to providing free drugs as "standard procedure" clearly stipulated that it "depends on the buyer." Thus it likely relates to providing testers or extras to regular and reliable clients. Only one front-line dealer, a dealer who operated on the street in the Ladbroke Grove area of North London, related that he regularly used the enticement of free drugs to get new clients without knowing anything about them (i.e., touting). Even here, however, the respondent was clear that he could "tell" a user and that he was essentially looking to draw users away from competition: providing free drugs (a taster) would allow the user to experience the quality of his samples. In a similar vein the respondent also claimed that he would be forced to give the odd freebie if he knew an existing customer was (or was thinking of) buying elsewhere.
That not all dealers consider the provision of free drugs as standard procedure is fairly clear. What dealers are trying to do is manage a relationship. One dealer FALL 2003 cognizant of this stated: "Yes (he gives freebies), but not too often…can get into trouble because they might get to expect it."
While it is clear that the behavior of drug dealers is rarely the consistent and coherent behavior that would be suggested by politicians and the media, the consistency of structure that often defines the differences in approach to providing freebies is worth noting. That is, although there is a range of practices among dealers, freebies are predominately offered to help bind existing relationships. They are rarely given to those unknown and/or not trusted by the dealer, although the concept of trust being used here is clearly a fluid one.
We should not forget that some differentiation of practice would also result from what dealers believe they should be doing as dealers. There is no "school" for dealers, and initiation into dealing is diverse and relatively unstructured, both in terms of practice and knowledge (Coomber, forthcoming) . One relatively inexperienced dealer interviewed about cutting cocaine reported using amphetamine as a cutting agent (Coomber, 1997a) . Amphetamine is almost never found in the forensic analysis of street cocaine, yet it is widely believed by users that it is a common cutting agent (Cohen, 1989; Coomber, 1997b; Decorte, 2001) . It was speculated that this novice dealer was cutting the cocaine he sold with amphetamine due to his existing belief that that is what he was supposed to do. In the research being reported here, one of the dealers alluded to such a possibility: "Up and coming (dealers) who don't know what the game's about will give freebies to encourage clients -just want to get rich quickly -don't really care who they sell to."
This position is also in contradiction to the commonly assumed rationale for the cutting of drugs that asserts that dealers are always trying to "fiddle" or shortchange their customers. Rather than always looking to cut the drugs they sell, in fact dealers are often concerned with getting a "rep" (reputation) for quality drugs, believe that the drugs have already been cut, are wary of cutting them further, and fear reprisal from those they sell to (Coomber, 1997a) .
GIVING CREDIT -THE CULTIVATION OF A SECURE, RELIABLE CLIENT BASE
The interviews revealed that providing credit was widespread. Fifteen of 19 dealers interviewed provided credit, but once again this was fairly tightly circumscribed. Credit was permitted almost exclusively to those described as either "regular trusted customers," "people I know," "friends," or people who are "safe." One street dealer explained: "Yes, to regular customers. If they let me down they won't get it again. A lot is based on credit and trust." Similar sentiments were expressed by a dealer who described himself as operating at the wholesale level: "Yes, originally I did but people still owe me. When I sold H it was cash or nothing." Two of the dealers were specific about heroin and crack cocaine not being available for credit. The inference here was that users of these two drugs were inherently less reliable than users of other drugs. The other dealers did not discriminate in this way and controlled the management of credit by being selective to whom (which individuals as opposed to what kind of drug user) it was given. Another, who described himself as being in between a street dealer and a wholesaler stated: "Seldom. To people who are safe, that can afford to. Some people spending £200 (about $332) a day." One mid-level wholesaler, for instance, who largely dealt with other lower level dealers explained the process at this level: "Yes, when dealing with large sums of money you're giving people bail -sale or return. Also, you might negotiate if the last batch was no good." Despite providing credit this dealer was one of those who never provided free drugs.
From the dealers' perspective, providing credit is distinct from how freebies are utilized in drug market transactions. Whereas freebies are a way of garnering loyalty, making it worthwhile for the user to come to the dealer, they also tend to be used to entice existing users away from other dealers and or to keep existing users "sweet." The "tasting" or testing of samples is also, for some, a common practice that reassures the buyer of the quality of the potential buy, while for others, it is a way of making their customers feel a little privileged. Credit, however, operates differently. Although credit does help cement relationships (and clearly it does tie the buyer to the dealer to a point), it is only extended to those already considered trustworthy. While most dealers provide credit, it is not the preferred way of conducting business. As we shall see below, not all users want to resort to credit in their transactions with drug dealers, whereas dealers who are also drug users employ it as a means to manage their buying and selling.
THE USERS' RESPONSES FREEBIES
When asked if a dealer had ever offered them freebies, 15 (25%) stated that this either had not happened to them and/or that this was not a genuine aspect of how the drug market worked. One 40-year-old respondent with a 15-year habit merely responded: "No, this is a dream. No money, no give nothing."
Of those who answered that dealers had offered them free drugs, none reported an offer by a dealer who did not know that they were already drug users. In fact, the vast majority stressed that the provision of free drugs was a sign that they were considered to be a good/respected customer -and only happened once the customer was well known and trusted by the dealer. However, users' experiences were far from consistent, and respondents had differing interpretations as to why freebies were provided. 
TASTERS, TESTERS AND OTHER DEVICES OF SECURING LOYALTY AND CUSTOM SEEKING CLIENTELE
While most of those who received freebies were well known to the dealer, a small number of respondents reported being offered free drugs by dealers who were not their regular suppliers as an enticement to gain their business: "Yeah, to get you onto their stuff. When I met new dealers, but the older ones knew me and what I took, but new ones -they'd always offer." And, "Yes, because of the competition between them (the dealers)."
These responses perhaps sum up the way that some users experienced the user/dealer relationship, but a number of other respondents reported (as did the 15 who reported never having been offered free drugs) that such a situation was neither routine nor predictable. One user, when asked if freebies had been offered, responded: "Yeh, …but very rare, and only recently (despite a 17-year habit) -a dealer trying to get me as a customer."
SEEKING TO RETAIN CLIENTELE
While 11 of the interviewees had been offered free drugs in an effort to attract them as new clients, others had primarily been offered drugs to retain them as customers. The supply of tasters and testers was mentioned by a further 11 interviewees. Some interpreted this as reflecting their status as a valued customer: "Yes [I have been offered freebies] but `cos I was worth a lot to them, or "Yeah, a bloke who supplies us sometimes give us a free £10 bag (about $17) for being a good customer. But I've never been given them to get me on stuff, just `cos we're good customers."
A number of these respondents have suggested that once a dealer has built up a relationship of relative trust with his/her client, he/she may give a little something in addition to the drugs being purchased for good (reliable) customers. This may be done up front or surreptitiously, by offering tasters or pretending they want the client to test the drugs for them. Again, this should not be viewed as routine, predictable, or even consistent behavior among dealers and is borne out by those never offered freebies and by some who have been: "Yeah, testers -it's quite rare really."
DRUGS FOR SERVICES BUT NOT MONEY
Clearly, how a user interprets what constitutes a freebie is sometimes ambiguous. One who had not been offered freebies declared: "No. I mean, I'd buy my whack and they wanted me to do them a favor and that was kudos -I wasn't going to do them a favor for nothing -they'd actually give to me to check it out." This respondent clearly felt that he was being asked to check the quality of the heroin as a kind of favor to the dealer and that this reflected his status as an experienced addict. While that may or may not have been the case, it did reflect another aspect of "free" drug provision -drugs for services rendered. In this case the user helped the dealer test the quality of the sample. Other respondents who indicated they had received free drugs reported driving dealers around, running errands, or weighing samples as examples of favors performed to obtain their freebies. The free drugs were not in this sense completely free, as they involved a certain amount of expended labor that was ultimately remunerated by the provision of heroin or other drugs.
Considerable research has reported the implication of gender and sex in drug transactions (Maher 1996a (Maher , 1996b Denton & O'Malley, 1999; Dunlap & Johnson, 1996; Taylor, 1993; Goldstein, Ouellet, & Fendrich, 1992; Sommers, Baskin, & Fagan, 1996) . The extent to which women resort to providing sex for drugs is contentious, probably overstated in the research literature (Denton & O'Malley, 2001) and may indeed be more prevalent in some geographical areas and amongst some groups of women than others (see May, Edmunds, & Hough, 1999) . In relation to this research, none of the 25 women users mentioned having been asked to provide sexual favors by dealers. It may be, of course, that they preferred not to reveal this information to the researcher. However, although sexual favors/victimization undoubtedly plays a part for many women in drug transactions, it is worth noting that this is distinct from the issue being explored here. Women who "pay" for drugs with sex are already existing/addicted drug users, and they cannot be considered to receive something for nothing. "Payment" is either being solicited or taken from them.
ACCURACY OF REPORTING
There is a certain amount of disparity among the experiences of users who reported being offered free drugs. Fifteen of the 60 reported that they had not been offered free drugs. Other buyers' interpretation of "free" actually related to services rendered. Some of the respondents indicated that they had been offered drugs for being good customers; however, this was not a regular occurrence. A small number, however, gave the impression that "it happens all the time" and that "they (the dealers) just want to get you as a customer." These respondents, rather than reporting faithfully on their actual experience, may in fact be relaying their general belief about what dealers do and why -a kind of "I know it's true." The idea that drug dealers regularly try to entice people by providing free drugs is commonly relayed. These respondents may thus be either exaggerating their experience, or it may, in fact, be the case. However, in the context of an interview, respondents may perhaps feel in some way inferior if they had not been offered free drugs, that they were not as immersed in the drugs scene as they would like the researcher to believe.
CREDIT
Regarding the provision of credit for drugs, 52 users said that they had been offered/permitted credit, six of whom specified that this was a rare occurrence. Seven reported that they had never been offered/permitted credit.
Once again, however, the overriding structural relationship for nearly all of these respondents was that the dealer was able to trust them because of an existing relationship. The buyers consistently relate that credit was extended to them either because they were good customers, regular buyers, and/or a "known" quantity. A few reasoned that the dealer provided credit to retain customers.
Five of those that had been offered either had not accepted it or had done so only reluctantly due to a concern about being indebted: "Yeah, but I never used to like taking credit `cos it's a downward track and you think oh, I'm not paying for it, I've still got x amount but I can get some more ..so I never really liked getting credit."
Another respondent however saw the offer of credit more positively, seeing it as helpful as opposed to problematic: "Yes. A regular customer. It's good as you can't always pay at the time."
OTHER CONTEXTS WHERE PUSHERS MAY OPERATE UNSOLICITED
This research suggests that the archetypal pusher who indiscriminately looks to sell his wares to any passerby, to children and the otherwise vulnerable, is an unhelpful way of understanding drug transaction activity. However, the "rave" and similar dance events do present a different context for drug sales, and users do report being approached by dealers although they themselves have not sought the dealer out. The dealer on the dance floor, however, has very little incentive to provide free drugs or credit to individuals that they do not know. If they know the individual in question, then the relationships outlined above are likely to apply. It may be the case that a dance hall based dealer will seek to sell fake or counterfeit drugs as something else (e.g., MDA as MDMA) if they are short of the drug required, as they do not expect to see the user again. This will only apply if the dealer does not frequent a particular venue as the "comeback" would likely be feared (see Coomber, 1997b for more on this). The underlying rationale for seeing freebies as enticing new users is related to the idea that the users will be hooked once they have tried the drug, and dance hall drugs do not tend to be of the normatively addictive type. Even if they were, unless the user were taking them daily for a period of time, he or she would not get addicted and therefore have no need to return to the dealer. Giving drugs to a passing stranger in the hope that they would come back for more would simply be throwing drugs (and therefore money) away. Finally, the vast majority of those who attend raves and dance clubs are existing drug users. The pusher in the dance hall, while reprehensible, is not the pusher on the street corner whispering to anyone who comes along.
DISCUSSION
The idea that heroin and other addictive drug use is partly spread through the activities of evil drug dealers enticing the uninitiated and otherwise vulnerable through the provision of free drugs remains unproven. As discussed, there are good reasons why such a marketing strategy would be logically and practicably flawed. This research, however, has indicated that providing free drugs to opiate users in London, while not uncommon, is tightly circumscribed by particular rationales and structures. In opposition to the rational of the archetypal freebie, free drugs are provided to existing users already known to the dealer and are intended to bolster the existing or potential buyer/seller relationship.
Although the provision of credit in drug transactions is also used to buoy such a relationship, it is more likely to be provided by sellers to those considered sufficiently trustworthy and usually to those with whom a relationship has been established. Together, the two modes of operation represent a means for the seller to enhance management of the dealing relationship by rewarding good expenditure and/or engaging new, recent, or occasional users in such a relationship (freebies), or by simply retaining and managing trusted clientele who cannot or would prefer not to pay up front (credit). It could be argued that providing free drugs to clients is a way of cultivating business, either in the sense of enticing users away from other dealers by allowing the tasting or testing of the quality of the dealer's wares, and bolstering existing business, by making the buyer feel special or as if they are getting a good deal.
Normatively, however, the provision of credit is used as a means to cement and acknowledge a relationship rather than as a means to cultivate new business. This differs marginally from Jacobs ' (1999) position in his observation and analysis of crack buyers/dealers in that he sees both activities as more closely related and as cultivation devices. There is, however, a danger of overstating the use of both freebies and credit -although extent of use may differ between the crack cocaine market in St. Louis and the heroin market 5 in London. The provision of both in this sample is by no means universal, consistent, or even predictable. While users are keen to get any extras they can, it is clear that these are provided under particular circumstances. Primarily, dealers provide free drugs to reward those who buy in sufficient quantity to be rewarded. It is unlikely that clients buying for sole use on a daily basis would be worthy of any extras. This may explain how 25% of the user sample had never been offered free drugs, while nearly all had been offered credit at some time.
Other reasons to provide free drugs would be for services rendered -however moderate -or to persuade a new contact to test a dealer's product in the hope of gaining a new customer. This latter reason is widely assumed by the users, but rarely mentioned by the dealers. Only one front-line dealer from this study effectively suggested that his/her client base tends to seek him/her out, and transactions are only made when satisfied of the contact's credentials (e.g., vouched for by another client).
The provision of free drugs according to this sample is therefore a relatively rare occurrence with dealers using it selectively and remaining wary of buyers expecting such provision on a regular basis. Likewise, the provision of credit may have advantages and disadvantages. From a dealer's perspective it can demonstrate loyalty to existing and trusted clients, but poorly managed it may result in unwanted debt and severance from the client. In relation to other dealers or user dealers below the seller (e.g., a wholesaler providing drugs to a house dealer or friend dealer) the provision of credit, once trust has been established, is less problematic. The dealer expects the buyer to pay for the drugs once they have sold them. A relationship like this starts with small amounts until the buyer has proven himself or herself trustworthy and builds to larger amounts over time. Friends and trusted clients report significant credit will normally be extended only to other sellers, a point also made by Jacobs (1999) and Skolnick et al. (1997) . From a user's perspective, as some of this sample suggested, the provision of credit may be problematic as it can lead to escalating debt and other problems as a consequence. For others, however, it helps them to manage their use when funds are not available.
NOTES
1
Under normal circumstances, this is clearly the case and numerous studies report that the route to addictive use is much longer than often supposed. While some individuals can become "hooked" almost immediately, in these instances it usually has something to do with a "will to addiction." In Coomber (in press), for example, a number of respondents reported moving to daily use straight away as they had wanted to assume an addicted lifestyle or had felt it inevitable and chose not to control their intake or resist the onset of addiction. It is highly unlikely that an unwitting child or individual would succumb in such a way.
2
But UK produced programs such as The Bill, Liverpool1, Eastenders, Grange Hill, and Brookside, to name a few, have all had storylines depicting a range of stereotypical dealer activities, including dangerous adulteration and dealers pushing free drugs. 3 Edmunds et al. (1996) describe closed markets as those where the purchase of illicit drugs is not straightforward, where the buyer needs to be a "known" quantity and/or has to traverse a number of barriers to protect the sellers. An open market is described as one where those barriers are significantly fewer, sometimes nominal, and where drugs can be sought without being known. 4 Use in this sense means "on and off." Many of the respondents reported having breaks or having stopped for a period (either forced or voluntarily).
5
The dealers in this survey, however, mostly had experience of selling both heroin and crack cocaine as well as experience earlier in their careers of selling drugs such as cannabis and amphetamine.
